Effects of Carbon Emission Taxes on Transportation Mode Selections and Social Welfare

Abstract

In this paper, we analyze how carbon emissions affect the selection of transportation modes and social welfare by using a two-stage Stackelberg gaming model. Based on this model, the government's optimal carbon-emission tax scheme and the company's optimal transportation mode and production decisions are explored. We find that: 1) whether or not the transport carbon-emission tax can increase social welfare depends on the relationships among the social cost of carbon (SCC), the transportation mode shifting threshold (TMST), and the biggest carbon-emission tax that a company can afford (BCRA); 2) a greater SCC implies a higher probability of improving social welfare via imposing transportation carbon-emission tax; and 3) a smaller TMST or BCRA yields a higher probability of improving social welfare when a carbon-emission tax is imposed. Further study shows that imposing a carbon-emission tax on the product with a higher production cost, a bigger product volume, or a bigger product density can increase the probability of improving social welfare.