Long‐Term Disagreement: Philosophical Models in Scriptural Reasoning and Receptive Ecumenism

Abstract

This article will explore points of contact between two practices of encounter between different traditions: scriptural reasoning (SR) and receptive ecumenism (RE).It will focus on shared philosophical shapes.This is not an area that has been explored much, and the findings of this inquiry should be treated as provisional.SR and RE will be characterised as strategies for dealing with long-term disagreement, that is as strategies that do not seek to preserve or promote such disagreement, but which face it in a non-utopian manner and seek to maintain a concern with truth while taking questions of tradition seriously.The significance of SR and RE lies in their mediation of a sophisticated anti-foundationalism and a rejection of secular universalism in practices whose participants are not experts in philosophy.This is significant, I shall argue, because the philosophical habits of participants in inter-faith engagement and ecumenical dialogue often display signs of foundationalism and secular universalism: SR and RE explicitly aim to change these habits.Their significance lies not in any new insights into philosophical method so much as in their capacity to embed certain philosophical developments, especially within pragmatism, in institutions, in such a way as to shape everyday practices.There is a body of literature, from a variety of practitioners, about both SR and RE. 1 I shall comment on two short pieces, one by Peter Ochs, 'Rules for Scriptural Reasoning' and one by Paul Murray, 'Receptive Ecumenism and Catholic Learning: Establishing the Agenda'. 2 Each is an introduction to their respective practices, naming the philosophical approaches that characterise them.These are named 'pragmatism', which for Ochs derives from the study of CS Peirce and for Murray 1 On Scriptural Reasoning see various issues of the Journal of Scriptural Reasoning (http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/