On the Ideological Foundations of Supreme Court Legitimacy in the American Public

TLDR

Conventional wisdom holds that individuals’ ideological preferences do not shape Supreme Court legitimacy, a view grounded in the assumption that the Court is objectively conservative and that disagreement stems from liberals while agreement comes from conservatives. The study argues that subjective ideological disagreement—between a person’s preferences and their perception of the Court’s ideological tenor—must be considered when explaining legitimacy, and that the Court’s policymaking can be reasonably seen as conservative, moderate, or liberal. Survey analysis reveals that subjective ideological disagreement strongly undermines legitimacy, with ideology’s effect on legitimacy varying by perceived Court tenor, and experimental results confirm this mechanism, highlighting the Court’s political perception.

Abstract

Conventional wisdom says that individuals’ ideological preferences do not influence Supreme Court legitimacy orientations. Most work is based on the assumption that the contemporary Court is objectively conservative in its policymaking, meaning that ideological disagreement should come from liberals and agreement from conservatives. Our nuanced look at the Court's policymaking suggests rational bases for perceiving the Court's contemporary policymaking as conservative, moderate, and even liberal. We argue that subjective ideological disagreement—incongruence between one's ideological preferences and one's perception of the Court's ideological tenor—must be accounted for when explaining legitimacy. Analysis of a national survey shows that subjective ideological disagreement exhibits a potent, deleterious impact on legitimacy. Ideology exhibits sensible connections to legitimacy depending on how people perceive the Court's ideological tenor. Results from a survey experiment support our posited mechanism. Our work has implications for the public's view of the Court as a “political” institution.