On the security of RC4 in TLS

Nadhem J. AlFardan, Daniel J. Bernstein, Kenneth G. Paterson, Bertram Poettering, Jacob C. N. Schuldt

TU/e Research Portal · 2013 · 138 citations · 5 references

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TL;DR

TLS is the de facto standard for secure Internet and mobile communications, providing confidentiality and integrity while supporting symmetric ciphers such as RC4. The paper presents ciphertext‑only plaintext recovery attacks on TLS when RC4 is used and discusses countermeasures. The attacks leverage recent statistical advances in RC4 analysis and novel findings presented in this work. Experimental evaluation demonstrates the feasibility of the ciphertext‑only plaintext recovery attacks.

Abstract

The Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol aims to provide confidentiality and integrity of data in transit across untrusted networks. TLS has become the de facto protocol standard for secured Internet and mobile applications. TLS supports several symmetric encryption options, including a scheme based on the RC4 stream cipher. In this paper, we present ciphertext-only plaintext recovery attacks against TLS when RC4 is selected for encryption. Our attacks build on recent advances in the statistical analysis of RC4, and on new findings announced in this paper. Our results are supported by an experimental evaluation of the feasibility of the attacks. We also discuss countermeasures.

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