Actions, intentions, and consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect

Abstract

One interpretation of the doctrine of double effect (DDE) holds that in situations in which good can be secured for some only if others suffer harm, the pursuit of a good tends to be less acceptable when a resulting harm is intended as a means rather than when it is merely foreseen. The doctrine captures certain moral intuitions about pairs of cases which have the same consequential profiles but in which the character of the intention differs. Quinn examines the DDE using three pairs of contrasting cases, two of which are medical examples: the "Direction of Resources" case and the "Guinea Pig" case, both involving allocation of life-saving resources, and the "Craniotomy" case and the "Hysterectomy" case, both involving fetal vs. maternal life. He concludes that the DDE "embodies our sense that certain forms of forced strategic subordination are especially inappropriate among free and equal agents."