Military review · 2004 · 112 citations · 0 references
Social SciencesConflict StudiesHistoryArmed ConflictMilitary HistoryWar StudiesEarly Modern WarfareMilitary DoctrineMilitary InstitutionsMilitary StrategyWar TheoryBattle StrategyMarine Corps Operations
RATHER THAN commenting on specifics of war with Iraq, I thought it might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and other conflicts. I call this framework Four Generations of Modern War. I developed framework of first three generations during 1980s, when I was laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to U.S. Marine Corps (USMC). (2) Marines kept asking, What will Fourth Generation be like? result was an article I co-authored for Marine Corps Gazette in 1989: The Changing Face of War: Into Fourth (3) (Our troops reportedly found copies of article in caves at Tora Bora, al-Qaeda hideout in Afghanistan.) Modern Warfare Four Generations began with Peace of Westphalia in 1648, treaty that ended Thirty Years' War. With that treaty, state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different entities had fought wars--families, tribes, religions, cities, business enterprises--using many different means, not just armies and navies. (Two of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue.) Now, state militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting state armed forces similar to themselves. First Generation. First Generation of Modern War, war of line-and-column tactics, where battles were formal and battlefield was orderly, ran roughly from 1648 to 1860. relevance of First Generation springs from fact that battlefield of order created a military culture of order. Most of things that distinguish military from civilian--uniforms, saluting, careful gradations of rank--were products of First Generation and were intended to reinforce culture of order. problem is that, around middle of 19th century, battlefield of order began to break down. Mass armies, soldiers who actually wanted to fight (an 18th-century soldier's main objective was to desert), rifled muskets, then breechloaders and machine guns, made old line-and-column tactics at fast obsolete, then suicidal. problem since then has been a growing contradiction between military culture and increasing disorderliness of battlefield. culture of order that was once consistent with environment in which it operated has become more and more at odds with it. Second Generation. Second Generation War was one answer to contradiction between culture of order and military environment. Developed by French Army during and after World War I, Second Generation war sought a solution in mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire. goal was attrition, and doctrine was summed up by French as the artillery conquers, infantry occupies. Centrally controlled firepower was carefully synchronized (using detailed, specific plans and orders) for infantry, tanks, and artillery in a conducted battle where commander was, in effect, conductor of an orchestra. Second Generation war came as a great relief to soldiers (or at least their officers) because it preserved culture of order. focus was inward, on rules, processes, and procedures. Obedience was more important than initiative. In fact, initiative was not wanted because it endangered synchronization. Discipline was top-down and imposed. Second Generation war is relevant today because U.S. Army and USMC learned Second Generation war from French during and after World War I, and it remains American way of war, as we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq. To Americans, war means putting steel on target. Aviation has replaced artillery as source of most firepower, but otherwise (and despite USMC's formal doctrine, which is Third Generation maneuver warfare), U.S. military today is as French as white wine and cheese. At USMC desert warfare training center in California, only thing missing is tricolor and a picture of General Maurice Gamelin in headquarters. …