The Economic History Review · 2010 · 33 citations · 20 references
Social SciencesEconomicsHistoryEconomic HistoryInternational Political EconomyPolitical EconomyEuropean PoliticsInterwar PeriodSovereign DebtBalkan HistoryConsolidated Financial SupervisionCreditor Control DoctrineDebt PoliticsInternational Finance HistoryInternational Political Economy CritiquePolitical Economy Of DefaultSovereign Debt Relief
Existing accounts overstate the gold standard’s role and underplay direct financial controls and the link between foreign borrowing and strategic alignment in the Balkan inter‑imperial rivalry. The study argues that conventional international political economy models miss the tension between national sovereignty and access to capital markets faced by peripheral debtors such as Bulgaria in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Bulgaria’s pre‑1914 politics were destabilized by creditor demands, and after World War I it faced even tighter creditor control; the debt relief of the 1930s came only at the cost of closer supervision, reframing Bulgaria as a victim of Nazi informal imperialism while its trade with Germany remained on a basis of sovereign equality.
Using the example of Bulgaria, we argue that familiar models of international political economy fail to capture the tension between national sovereignty and access to capital markets experienced by peripheral debtors in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Existing accounts exaggerate the significance of the gold standard as a good housekeeping seal of approval and underestimate the role of direct financial controls. Furthermore, they underestimate the linkage in zones of inter‐imperial rivalry, such as the Balkans, between foreign borrowing and strategic alignment. We show how Bulgaria found its politics destabilized prior to 1914 by the demands of its creditors. After defeat in the First World War, Bulgaria was forced to submit to an even tighter system of creditor control. Though it obtained substantial debt relief during the 1930s, these concessions were gained not through an assertion of national sovereignty and default, but at the price of even closer supervision. This in turn casts new light on the conventional view of Bulgaria as a victim of Nazi ‘informal imperialism’. In light of Bulgaria's previous experience, the more striking feature of its trade relations with Hitler's Germany is that they were conducted on a basis of sovereign equality.
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