Multilateralising Regionalism: Relaxing the Rules of Origin Or Can Those Pecs Be Flexed?

Abstract

In this paper we first explain why rules of origin are a necessary feature of preferential trading arrangements, but why they also serve to distort trade and can therefore be used for protectionist purposes, and why they have a powerful natural impetus towards strengthening the spaghetti bowl effect in international trade. Secondly, we then examine the impact of the relaxation of the potential constraining impact of rules of origin in the European context which was achieved through the introduction of the Pan-European Cumulation system (PECS). We provide empirical evidence at both the aggregate and sectoral level which reveals the positive impact of the relaxation of rules of origin via the introduction of “diagonal cumulation” arrangements between the EU and its’ trading partners. Thirdly, the discussion turns to a consideration of appropriate policy options designed both to minimise the spaghetti bowl effect, and to maximise the benefits from regionalism for developing countries.