‘This gun is our food’: Disarming the White Army militias of South Sudan

Abstract

Abstract The continued presence of 'other armed groups' poses a significant challenge to furthering peace and stability in post-conflict environments. A good example of this was 'White Army' militias, which maintained an armed presence after the signing of Sudan's Comprehensive Peace Agreement in 2005. This article presents an empirical mapping of the White Army militias as well as a detailed analysis of the disarmament strategies that were implemented for them during the course of 2006. The article concludes with an analysis of the successes in achieving disarmament of White Army militias as well as the continuing challenges faced by Sudanese authorities and the international community alike in building sustainable conditions for peace. Notes 1. The CPA allowed for an autonomous state of South Sudan within the country of Sudan. Its main provision was a referendum on independence for South Sudan in 2011. Furthermore, of note to this article, the SPLA was deemed the official army of South Sudan prior to the referendum. Lastly, as part of the CPA, the UN established a peacekeeping mission in South Sudan known as UNMIS. 2. Interview with Lou Nuer elder, Malakal, 5 August 2006. 3. Note that White Army militia concentrations are found in Upper Nile State but to a much lower extent than is seen in Jonglei State. The Lou Nuer comprise the bulk of White Army militias and they reside primarily in Jonglei State. 4. CitationUNMIS, "Security Related Events" 5. This is a contentious argument and there has been little to no formal academic research into it. However, it was a common sentiment of both southerners and aid workers dealing with security issues in Upper Nile and Jonglei states. 6. A meeting was held between SPLA, GoSS, and community representatives from the respective communities that agreed that civilian disarmament was necessary, especially of White Army militias. 7. IRIN News. 'Fragile Disarmament in the south.' 18 August 2006. Most of these deaths were not combat deaths but from thirst and starvation after they were scattered following the fighting. 8. Sudan Mirror, 'White Army, Case for Disarmament' 14–27 August 2006. 9. Interview with UNMIS sources, Malakal, 6 August 2006. Following these clashes, one group of remnant White Army militiamen retreated to the North and stopped near the town of Korfluss.The SPLA decided to allow these White Army remnants to stay in the area after they agreed to cease hostilities and be absorbed into the SPLA gradually. A second group of White Army remnants, attempting to flee further to the north was stopped by the SPLA and forcefully disarmed. A third group was rumoured to have fled from central Jonglei State to the west where it disappeared. 10. Interview with UNDP DDR Officer, Malakal, 4 August 2006. Note that the County Commissioner is the highest-ranking official in Sudan's local administrations. 11. This number should be qualified. The total number of arms in Akobo County is unknown. However, it is likely to be considerably higher than 1,000, meaning that many arms were left uncollected. One NGO, PACT, estimated (based on field research) to UNMIS that 'Outside of Akobo town itself, approximately 75–90% of male civilians above the age of 15 possess automatic weapons.' This means that a total of approximately 1,000 guns, while substantial, is not very high proportionate to the potential number of guns most likely in the county, something impossible to know in precise detail. PACT presentation to UNMIS in late-April 2006 in Malakal entitled 'Briefing on Security and Arms Control in Jonglei.' 12. Interview with Ulang County Commissioner, Malakal, 10 July 2006. 13. Interview with SPLA Brig. General Charles Lam, Nasir, 24 July 2006. 14. Interview with local youth, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 15. Interview with ex-White Army members, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 16. Interview with ex-White Army members, Walgak, 20 August 2006. One, for instance, noted, 'We joined because there was no government to help us.' 17. It is a phrase often heard amongst Nuer youth of the gun that 'this is our food' meaning while other tribes grow food; they use the gun for their sustenance. This is especially so during a time of war when traditional economic systems have been disrupted, such as herding and agriculture. 18. Interview with SPLM Security Advisor, Malakal, 16 July 2006. 19. Interview with SPLM Security Advisor, Malakal, 16 July 2006 20. Interview with UNDP Officer, Juba, 17 August 2006. 21. Interview with White Army youth, Walgak, 20 August 2006. 22. The SSDF is an umbrella organization of southern militias formed through the signing of peace agreements known as the Khartoum Agreement and the Fashoda Agreement in 1997. The agreements aligned the SSDF with the Khartoum government against the SPLA. 23. Interview with White Army youth, Walgak, 20 August 2006. 24. Interviews with UNMIS source, Malakal, 9 August 2006 and UNDP Officer, Juba, 17 August 2006. 25. Interview with group of Lou Nuer elders, Malakal, 16 July 2006. 26. Interview with Speaker of the Upper Nile State Assembly, Malakal, 2 August 2006. The GoSS official went on to describe this condition as a 'psychological problem' whereby the youth are excessively paranoid about their present and future conditions and owning a gun is the one thing they can do to calm themselves. 27. Interview with recently disarmed youth, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 28. Interview with recently disarmed youth, Akobo, 22 August 2006 29. Interview with local youth, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 30. Interview with local youth, Akobo, 22 August 2006 31. Interview with UNDP officer, Juba, 17 August 2006. 32. This tendency of the militias to temporarily unify against larger enemies mirrors the organisational make-up of the Nuer nation more broadly. As the anthropologist CitationEvans-Pritchard noted in The Nuer 'The Nuer … are divided into a number of tribes which have no common organization or central administration and these peoples may be said to be, politically, a congeries of tribes, which sometimes form loose federations', 5. 33. Interviews with Nasir County Commissioner, Nasir, 31 July 2006 and Jonglei State Deputy Governor, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 34. Interview with UNMIS source, Malakal, 19 July 2006 and UNMIS Brief, 'Security Related Events', 4. For instance, there was an allegation that a SAF helicopter was used to re-supply White Army militiamen directly during their conflicts with the SPLA. Furthermore, it is notable that after the White Army remnants left Yuai in May they went to Dolieb Hill area near Malakal, allegedly with the original intention to recuperate and to replenish their freshly depleted stocks of armaments from Thomas Mabior's SSDF unit barracked there. 35. For instance, it was feared that White Army militiamen were going to Ethiopia in the dry season to buy ammunition from Ethiopian rebels or still well armed communities. 36. Interview with Lou Nuer SSDF member, Malakal, 29 July 2006. 37. UNMIS Brief, 'Security Related Events', 4. The brief also stated, 'SPLA assesses that SAF continues support to former SSDF of Yuai under the command of Simon Weijang Reth, deputy of Cdr. Simon Gatwic and is able to reorganize the scattered White Armies.' 38. Interview with Lou Nuer SSDF member, Malakal, 29 July 2006. It was noted that amongst the Nuer, there frequently is 'in-fighting' between the various Nuer groups but they can at times form loose federations. It seems that the confrontation with the SPLA in early to mid-2006 was an example of this and that was largely a result of the rallying role of the SSDF commanders. The importance of personal relationships is very important to this support. Individual commanders have long ties to specific communities and the personal loyalties developed carry significant weight. Furthermore, it is more likely that whatever support White Army militias were getting was coming through a couple of SSDF commanders, also on a limited scale. 39. CitationUNDP, 'Roots of Conflict'. For instance, as noted in the UNDP report on the 1991 'great split' in the SPLA: 'Many Nuer supported the Nasir faction [of Lam Akol and Riek Machar] as an anti-Dinka move and could be coupled with anti-Bor Dinka sentiments.' 40. Interview with UNMIS source, Malakal, 9 August 2006. 41. Interview with Akobo Women's Association leader, Akobo, 23 August 2006. 42. Interview with UNDP DDR officer, Juba, 17 August 2006. 43. Interview with youth, Akobo, 22 August 2006. The youth noted that the encouragement of family and neighbours was an 'important factor' in them volunteering to hand in their weapons. 44. Sudan Mirror. 'White Army, Case for Disarmament', 14–27 August 2006. 45. Interview with Lou elder, Malakal, 5 August 2006. The elder also noted: 'Food shortages resulted because when there was fighting many huts [and] stored food was destroyed so now have nothing to eat. Some huts were destroyed as punishment by the SPLA while others were looted by bandits and neighbours when they were temporarily vacated by people fleeing the fighting.' While the violence had occurred mostly in March and May, the repercussions in terms of hunger for the broader community in central Jonglei were felt most direly during the lean season in July and August. 46. See, for example, CitationKingma, Demobilisation in Sub-Saharan Africa . 47. This idea was raised in an interview with UNDP DDR officer in Juba, South Sudan. Interestingly, while UNDP officers in general seemed to favour community approaches, individual incentives were offered in Akobo County. This action seemed to provoke much internal debate with UNDP as it was feared it would create a precedent for the rest of the south and force the UN to adopt an individual approach for their DDR programming rather than work through voluntary community programmes. 48. Interview with UNDP DDR officer, Malakal, 4 August 2006. 49. The White Army militias follow the leadership of their local chiefs. For the Nuer militias of the White Army, it is notably that tribal leadership is chosen through quite democratic means rather than being hereditary in nature. Furthermore, it is also interesting to note that during discussions with Lou elders, a frequent complaint of theirs was that Lou Nuer youth in White Army militias simply did not listen to the elders in any case. Through their membership in the militias, and ownership of firearms, they were greatly empowered to resist being influenced by tribal leadership other than their own militia commanders. 50. Interview with local SPLM security official, Malakal, 16 July 2006. This caution of the SPLA for traditional authorities is long held and it parallels their general suspicion of other alternative power structures in the south, notably the churches. 51. Interview with Akobo County Commissioner, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 52. Interview with Jonglei State Deputy-Governor, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 53. Interview with group of ex-White Army youth, Walgak, 22 August 2006. 54. Interview with group of ex-White Army youth, Walgak, 22 August 2006 55. Interview with Akobo County Commissioner, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 56. Rather it is for demobilisation of redundant SPLA soldiers after a registration exercise. 57. Interview with UNDP DDR officer, Juba, 17 August 2006. 58. For instance, petrol for boats and technical advice for registering guns and managing collection sites. This technical support should be qualified. It was notable that the UNMIS/UNDP efforts were significantly furthered through the expertise of a couple individual staff members who had extensive knowledge in South Sudan affairs, built over years of experience in the south. It is doubtful that a general UN response without the thoughtful input of expert individuals with field experience could have achieved nearly as much. For instance, some UNMIS/UNDP officials spoke local languages and near all had at least several years experience working in emergency situations with local political actors and groups in the south. This experience and expertise is priceless and the institutional success of the UN is dependent on it. 59. Interview with UNDP DDR officer, Juba, 17 August 2006. One problem with a foreign presence is that if it is especially transient, locals lose faith in it to secure them. The continued presence of the UN troops and aid officials throughout the exercise helped to renew faith in the UN (which had waned with its frequent comings and goings during the civil war). 60. Interview with UNDP DDR officer, Malakal, 4 August 2006. It was noted that the simple presence of boats going up and down the river in the Akobo vicinity flying the UN flag played a substantial 'public relations' role in letting the community known that a UN presence was in the area. 61. Interview with local traders, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 62. The exception to this was PACT, which provided funding and technical advice to indigenous NGOs but otherwise largely left indigenous NGOs to drive the process. 63. Interview with NHDF Programme Officer, Akobo, 22 August 2006. The first peace meetings was held in August 2005 for inter-Akobo reconciliation; the second in November 2005 to create dialogue and reconciliation between the Jikany Nuer of Nasir and Akobo's Lou Nuer; and the third meeting was held in July 2006 between the Murle and Akobo's Lou Nuer to agree to voluntary disarmament and reconciliation. It should be noted that much of NHDF's approach was built off the 'grassroots' peacemaking approaches advocated by the international NGO PACT and its founder Paul Murphy. This approach eschews higher level, static dialogue in favour of a dynamic process that actively engages groups and individuals at the local community level. PACT funded the NHDF's activities in Akobo. 64. Interview with PACT Programme Officer, Akobo, 20 August 2006. 65. Interview with PACT Community Development Officer, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 66. Interview with NHDF Programme Officer, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 67. Interview with PACT Community Development Officer, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 68. Interview with NHDF Programme Officer, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 69. For instance, a one-month training package will be provided to newly disarmed youth through an indigenous NGO, the Akobo Youth Association. 70. Interview with PACT Training Consultant, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 71. Interview with Akobo Youth Association staff, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 72. Interview with Jonglei State Deputy-Governor, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 73. It is interesting to note when discussions were held with rural southerners about their 'security' concerns, cattle raiding in itself was almost never raised as a primary one. It is an act in the area so prevalent and common that it seems to not merit much attention in itself by locals. Furthermore, the two issues of blood feuding and cattle raiding are closely interlinked because cattle raiding is a response to and a cause for blood feuding. 74. This was a general sentiment expressed by southerners on the significance of cattle raiding historically versus its current manifestation. It is impossible to justify this claim statistically but future academic research would be very worthwhile to look at historical trends and compare them against post-conflict reconstruction efforts in the south. 75. Interview with Lou Nuer elder, Akobo, 22 August 2006. The Nuer elder explained, 'Even before guns, in Nuer tradition, there is retribution but if you kill somebody else, a compensation arrangement can be made.' This 'compensation arrangement' then prevents the tensions from escalating into a violent blood feud. 76. Again, this was a general sentiment of many southerners, notably those in rural communities where interviews were conducted like Walgak, Nasir and Akobo. 77. It is notable that the disarmament celebrations held in Akobo, Jonglei State in mid-August 2006 were marred by groups of youth who mocked one another verbally, as well as threw rocks back and forth, as being 'cowards' because they had not responded to previous violence between themselves since they had been newly disarmed. The local police arrested many youths for this 'incitement' but the event serves to illustrate how ingrained in the youth the notions of revenge killings have become to maintaining individual and community 'honour.' 78. Interview with local resident, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 79. Interview with local resident, Akobo, 22 August 2006. It is notable that in other neighbouring towns where government control had been in effect relatively longer, such as Nasir, the cattle compensation system was restarted quickly and served to limit the blood feuding in the area. Akobo, which was one of the most violent parts of all of the south during the civil war, saw its cattle compensation almost entirely ended, and hence had a very high level of blood feuding. 80. Interview with Akobo County Commissioner, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 81. Gambella province, in western Ethiopia alongside Sudan's border, was the major base for the SPLA throughout the 1980s. Akobo town has for its part hosted many anti-Ethiopian government rebels; most recently, members of the Oromo Liberation Front. 82. The Akobo County Commissioner for instance noted: 'I hope Ethiopia will soon finish all disarmament and we'll have no problems with armed people coming across the border- rebels or civilians.' The Gaguan Nuer in Ethiopia, for instance, were at the time of the disarmament exercise still armed and there was a worry that they might raid Akobo County, especially given their long held animosities towards the Lou Nuer. 83. Interview with UNDP DDR officer, Malakal, 4 August 2006. 84. Sudan Tribune. 'South Sudan, Ethiopia discuss Lou-Nuer peace process', 6 October 2006. 85. Interview with Akobo County Commissioner, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 86. The Ethiopian Government alleges that the Eritrean Government supports these groups logistically. For instance, it is alleged that the town of Pagak in eastern Upper Nile State is used as a logistics base to supply arms and ammunition. 87. Interviews with Akobo County Commissioner, Akobo, 22 August 2006 & UNDP DDR officer, Malakal, 4 August 2006. 88. Interview with Akobo County Commissioner, Akobo, 22 August 2006. 89. It was decided to first start with the Jikany Nuer, and then proceed to the Lou Nuer and then the Murle, etc. 90. Interview with Lou Nuer elder, Malakal, 6 July 2006. 91. The political challenges of rolling waves of disarmament are significant and anti-SPLA forces, such as the SSDF, have been quick to capitalise on the situation and accuse the SPLA of targeting individual communities for 'pay-back.' 92. Interview with UNMIS Military Observer, Malakal, 11 August 2006. These Murle attacks have mostly been cattle raiding and banditry against Lou villages. 93. Interview with UNDP DDR officer, Malakal, 4 August 2006. Although re-enforcements were promised, immediately after the disarmament exercise was completed SPLA forces in Akobo County were very few in number, mostly in small groups of ten in some village for a total of two battalions in the entire county, which was not enough to provide security to all of the communities. 94. This experience was one of the primary rationales of the Akobo County government to invite the UN to help facilitate and monitor a peaceful disarmament exercise and why it was keen to avoid the same large SPLA contingent from proceeding further east where it might 'eat off' Akobo County as well. 95. Interview with UNMIS Military Observer, Malakal, 10 August 2006 & UNMIS, 'Security Related Events.' An interview with UNMIS Military observers confirmed that as the SPLA does not have adequate logistics chains, it did in fact 'eat off' civilians in central Jonglei State and used them for housing too. Furthermore, the UNMIS UNMAC Brief further noted that, 'The SPLA does not provide protection for the disarmed population, though its soldiers are stationed in the area; they are eating off the local community, instead.' 96. Arnold noted that in his travels around Jonglei and Upper Nile states, police were far and few between to completely non-existent. 97. Interview with Murle youth, Lokongole, 23 August 2006. Murle youth explained themselves that disarmament would be resisted, largely for the same reasons argued by Lou Nuer youth earlier. 98. Interview with Murle chiefs, Akobo, 23 August 2006. Murle chiefs who participated in peace meetings in Akobo argued that, 'If the Lou have problems now from the Murle, it will only be the [SSDF] militias trying to cause problems.' 99. Interview with Murle chiefs, Akobo, 23 August 2006. A Murle chief stated, 'We don't want to be forcefully disarmed by the SPLA. We want the chiefs to work with the local administration to collect the guns like they did in Akobo. We don't want to be like Yuai.' 100. Interview with Murle chiefs, Akobo, 23 August 2006. A Murle chief stated, 'We don't want to be forcefully disarmed by the SPLA. We want the chiefs to work with the local administration to collect the guns like they did in Akobo. We don't want to be like Yuai.' Additional informationNotes on contributorsMatthew B. Arnold Matthew B. Arnold is a PhD candidate at the London School of Economics and Political Science, Department of International Relations. Previously he has worked as a humanitarian aid worker in assorted parts of Asia and Africa. Chris Alden Dr Chris Alden lectures in international relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. Dr Alden has written extensively on post-conflict peace building, publishing in internationally recognised journals such as Politique Africaine, Journal of Modern African Studies, African Affairs and the Review of African Political Economy. His books include China in Africa (Zed 2007), Mozambique and the Construction of the New African State (Palgrave 2002) and, with Garth le Pere, South Africa's Post-Apartheid Foreign Policy (Oxford/IISS 2003). Dr Alden taught at the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, from 1990 to 2000.