Contributions of Socially Distributed Cognition to Social Epistemology: the Case of Testimony

Abstract

The goal of this paper is to review and analyze norms philosophically associated\nwith the process of testimony and to investigate to what extent they are\nconsistent with empirical knowledge supplied by cognitive science. Traditionally,\nthe problem of testimony used to arise when it was supposed, from the\nviewpoint of an individualistic epistemology, that followed the dictum stated by\nrationalists and empiricists in Modernity, that knowledge had to be tested personally.\nHowever, recent disciplines and approaches, like Socially Distributed\nCognition and Social Epistemology, provide alternative ways of thinking. This\nis the case when we consider the group as the truly significant cognitive unit\nand from such perspective we try to solve the problem of testimony. Therefore,\nour aim is to examine the reasons why SDC offers a good model for explaining\nsome of the paradoxes and epistemological problems that arise when we consider\nthe issue of testimony in the development of science.