Paraconsistent logic program based safety verification for air traffic control

Abstract

It has become a crucial issue to assure the safety for air traffic control. We consider how some air traffic accidents can be avoided by verifying the safety for air traffic control logically. We propose a theoretical framework for a logical safety verification for air traffic control based on a paraconsistent logic program called an Extended Vector Annotated Logic Program with Strong Negation (EVALPSN for short). Compared to other kinds of safety verification such as safety verification for railway interlocking, the safety verification for air traffic control contains more uncertainty and sometimes has to deal with probabilistic datum. Therefore, we extend EVALPSN to probabilistic EVALPSN (P-EVALPSN for short) for dealing with the safety verification containing probability. We introduce the ideas of the safety verification based on both EVALPSN and P-EVALPSN, taking a simple example for landing clearance by air traffic controllers.