Stanford Technology Law Review · 2002 · 148 citations · 0 references
LawCompetition LawIntellectual Property LawAntitrust LawIntellectual PropertyPatent LawAntitrust PolicyAntitrust RemediesAntitrust ReviewIntellectual Property ProtectionIntellectual Property RightsPatent PoolsAntitrust EconomicsAntitrust Policy DesignCompetitive PressuresDownstream CompetitionPatent CompetitionPatent Pool LicensingPatent Pooling Agreements
This paper reviews the antitrust treatment of patent pooling and cross-licensing arrangements from E. Bement v. National Harrow, decided in 1902, to the Department of Justice business review letters on the MPEG and DVD patent pools. I examine the factors that the courts identified as pertinent to the antitrust outcome and compare them to the competitive factors identified in the DOJ/FTC Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property. Until recently, the competitive relationship of the patents was not a major determinant of the antitrust outcome in most cases. Instead, the courts have focused on restrictive licensing terms that affect downstream prices. I consider the logic of this approach to evaluating antitrust liability. I also propose an approach to evaluating the antitrust risks of arrangements that combine potentially blocking patents.