The Cardoso Government's Reform Agenda: A View from the National Congress, 1995–1998

Abstract

Reform agendas are no novelty in Brazilian politics. Perhaps the first agenda was foisted on Brazil by the Marquis de Pombal during the colonial period (Maxwell 1995). In the independence period during the Second Empire (1840-89), reforms were frequent, especially after the Triple Alliance War in the 1870s and 1880s, as successive cabinets labored under strong pressures for change. With enhanced political autonomy granted to state governments by the constitution of the First Republic (1889-1930) and a concentration of national power in the hands of the mineiros and paulistas-the governors of Minas Gerais and Sao Paulo-in their cafe cor leite power-sharing arrangement, reform, especially of the economic system, became synonymous with enhancing profits for those elites. In the late 1920s, when demands for political, social, and economic reforms came mostly from urban workers and an incipient middle class, punctuated by minor (1922) and major (1924) military revolts, the decadent First Republic elite was incapable of change or even of perceiving the need for same (M. C. C. Souza 1974). Modern Brazil's most thoroughgoing reforms were executed during the first presidency of Getfilio Vargas (1930-45). The national armed forces finally consolidated their power over state military organizations. Import substitution began in earnest, and the state launched a broad intervention in the nation's economy. The so-called question was incorporated (coopted) into the reform agenda; modern social and labor legislation was adopted, complete with labor courts, retirement and health care systems, and workers' compensation. Vargas created the DASP, or Public Service Administration, in 1936, charging it to reform and modernize public administration, and the first comprehensive civil service laws were passed (Graham 1968). Luciano Martins (1995) believes that this important attempt at modernization was tempered by a strong culture of patrimonialism and clientelism that even the military regime of 1964-85 was unable to alter substantially. That regime resorted to parallel recruitment via the CLT (the 1943 Labor Code) and state enterprises. Until 1945, most reforms came almost totally from the initiative of the executive branch with very little input from the Congress. After the 1946 ardoso Government's Reform Agenda: ie from the National Congress,