Thought A Journal of Philosophy · 2014 · 39 citations · 5 references
Natural SciencesPsychologyCausal InferencePhilosophy Of ScienceProbability TheoryEmpirical EvidenceHypothesis TestingScientific EvidenceEvidence TheoryNature Of Scientific EvidenceTheories Of Evidence
We argue elsewhere that explanatoriness is evidentially irrelevant (Roche and Sober 2013). Let H be some hypothesis, O some observation, and E the proposition that H would explain O if H and O were true. Then O screens-off E from H: Pr(H | O & E)=Pr(H | O). This thesis, hereafter “SOT” (short for “Screening-OffThesis”), is defended by appeal to a representative case.The case concerns smoking and lung cancer. McCain and Poston grant that SOT holds in cases, like our case concerning smoking and lung cancer, that involve frequency data. However, McCain and Poston contend that there is a wider sense of evidential relevance—wider than the sense at play in SOT—on which explanatoriness is evidentially relevant even in cases involving frequency data. This is their main point, but they also contend that SOT does not hold in certain cases not involving frequency data. We reply to each of these points and conclude with some general remarks on screening-off as a test of evidential relevance.
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How Probabilities Reflect Evidence
James M. Joyce · Philosophical Perspectives · 2005 · 237 citations
Why Explanatoriness Is Evidentially Relevant
Kevin McCain, Ted Poston · Thought A Journal of Philosophy · 2014 · 75 citations