Journal of Real Estate Research · 2011 · 47 citations · 60 references
BusinessCorporate GovernanceReal EstateAgency TheoryCorporate FinanceReal Estate FinanceAsymmetric InformationCorporate Decision-makingCorporate Governance MechanismsInformation AsymmetryOwnership StructureReal Estate Investment TrustsBid-ask Spread AnalysisBid-ask Spread EffectsBid-ask Spread ReactionBoard Access To InformationInformation Asymmetry EffectsInformation Asymmetry ReductionReal Estate Investment Trusts (Reits)Reit Corporate Governance
Recent research suggests that the unique legal and organizational structure of Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs), relative to other types of corporations, may vitiate the need for and the effectiveness of internal corporate governance. Our results indicate that information asymmetry, as measured by the percentage bid-ask spreads demanded by the market, is reduced by appropriately structured REIT governance. Using data from the 2003 to 2006 period, we find that increasing the financial incentives for board members reduces asymmetric information, and that the combination of experienced board members and independent audit committees with financial expertise diminishes asymmetric information.
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