The Evolution of Social Norms in Common Property Resource Use

Rajiv Sethi, E. Somanathan

American Economic Review · 1996 · 574 citations · 23 references

Concepts

TL;DR

Commonly owned renewable resources face extraction challenges that can be studied using evolutionary game theory. The study examines how extraction of such resources unfolds within an evolutionary‑game‑theoretic framework. The authors integrate resource‑stock dynamics with evolutionary‑game dynamics and analyze how changes in prices, technology, and social cohesion affect extraction behavior and long‑run stock. The results show that norms of restraint and punishment can stabilize cooperation, but when key parameters cross thresholds, norms collapse, reducing the long‑run stock and potentially causing extinction. © 1996 American Economic Association.

Abstract

The problem of extracting commonly owned renewable resources is examined within an evolutionary-game-theoretic framework. It is shown that cooperative behavior guided by norms of restraint and punishment may be stable in a well-defined sense against invasion by narrowly self-interested behavior. The resource-stock dynamics are integrated with the evolutionary-game dynamics. Effects of changes in prices, technology, and social cohesion on extraction behavior and the long-run stock are analyzed. When threshold values of the parameters are crossed, social norms can break down leading generally to the lowering of the long-run stock and possibly to its extinction. Copyright 1996 by American Economic Association.

References

23