Journal of Political Economy · 2017 · 162 citations · 40 references
ManagementPublic AdministrationPublic ManagementExecutive CompensationPublic Choice TheoryPublic EconomicsAdministrative TransparencyCorporate TransparencyGovernment Performance ReportingGovernment TransparencyPay TransparencyPublic Sector IncentivesEmployee Reactions To Pay TransparencyPay Compression EffectsPublic Sector Pay SettingPublic Sector Wage AdjustmentPublic Sector Wage PolicyQuit RatesSalary DisclosureTransparency
This paper asks whether pay disclosure in the public sector changes wage setting at the top of the distribution. I examine a 2010 California mandate that required municipal salaries to be posted online. Among top managers, disclosure led to approximately 7 percent average compensation declines, and a 75 percent increase in their quit rate, relative to managers in cities that had already disclosed salaries. The wage cuts were largely nominal. Wage cuts were larger in cities with higher initial compensation, but not in cities where compensation was initially out of line with (measured) fundamentals. The response is more consistent with public aversion to high compensation than the effects of increased accountability.
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A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
Ernst Fehr, Klaus M. Schmidt · The Quarterly Journal of Economics · 1999 · 11.1K citations · Full text
Alan Harrison, Chris Robinson, Orley Ashenfelter et al. · Canadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d économique · 1989 · 3.2K citations