RePEc: Research Papers in Economics · 1998 · 41 citations · 8 references
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Public AffairsEconomicsPublic FinancePublic EconomicsTax PolicyTaxationIncome DistributionIncome RedistributionIncome TaxationMinimum Income SchemesOptimal TaxationWelfare EconomicsEthics Of Tax PolicyMarginal Tax Rate AnalysisMarginal Tax Rate EffectsMinimum TaxationOptimal Income Tax TheoryOptimal Income TaxationOptimal Tax Rate DesignOptimal Tax Rates
In a model where agents have unequal production skills and di#erent preferences, we build social welfare functions which rely only on ordinal non-comparable information on individual preferences. Social welfare functions are required to satisfy properties of compensation for inequalities in skills, and responsibility for preferences. Then, assuming skills and preferences are unobservable, we use these social welfare functions to design optimal income tax schemes. We obtain ethical foundations for, among others, a maximized minimal income, a zero marginal tax rate for low incomes, and increasing marginal tax rates. # We thank L. Gevers for stimulating conversations, L. Kranich for valuable comments on an earlier draft, J. L. Prigent for technical advice, and participants at seminars in Aix, CORE, Leuven, Montreal, Namur and Paris, and at conferences in Manresa #May 1997#, Cergy #June 1997#, Toulouse #Aug. 1997#, Quimper #June 1998#, Tuscaloosa #May 1998# and Vancouver #July 1998# for their comments. Financial support from EC contract FMRX-CT96-0055 is gratefully acknowledged. y THEMA, Universit#e de Cergy-Pontoise. z FNRS, Facult#es Universitaires Notre-Dame de la Paix#Namur, and CORE. 1 1
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John Rawls · Harvard University Press eBooks · 1999 · 1.4K citations
The Nash Social Welfare Function
Mamoru Kaneko, Kenjiro Nakamura · Econometrica · 1979 · 235 citations