Armies of Snow and Armies of Sand: The Impact of Soviet Military Doctrine on Arab Militaries

Abstract

During the Cold War, the Soviet Union emerged as the principal military patron of Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Accordingly, many have assumed that the armed forces of these states adopted Soviet military doctrine, and that this factor accounted for their generally lackluster battlefield performance. In fact, on Soviet military doctrine varied considerably between these three militaries, and at times contributed to success when they adapted it to their own cultural predilections and operational requirements. On October 12, 1973, the Iraqi Army joined the October Arab-Israeli War. That afternoon, newly arrived tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) of the 12th Armored Brigade, 3rd Armored Division, lumbered into combat against the battle weary Israeli 240th Armored Division, as it threatened to outflank Syrian defenses on the northern Damascus plain. The Iraqis drove Soviet T-55 tanks. They advanced in two long columns under a heavy but indiscriminate supporting artillery barrage. To some of the Israelis lying in wait on the tels of southwestern Syria, the Iraqis looked liked the very model of the Soviet army on the attack.2 Nothing could have been farther from the truth. Though using Soviet equipment, the Iraqi army still employed a mostly British-based system, with an admixture of American, French, Soviet, and some indigenous Iraqi practices thrown in (a fact that Israeli military intelligence was well aware of). Although difficult for the Israelis to discern at the time, the Iraqi tanks and APCs were not moving to contact in a Soviet-style assault line, but rather were attempting to use British-style overwatch techniques.3 This, however, would not be the last time that some observers would mistake appearance for reality. During the Cold War, the Soviet Union emerged as the principal military patron of the three most powerful states: Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. At the height of their military exertions-the 1973 Arab-Israeli war for Egypt and Syria, the 1991 Gulf War for Iraq-the armed forces of these states were equipped largely, if not almost exclusively, with Soviet arms. As a result, many military analysts assumed that the armed forces of these states also adopted Soviet doctrine4 and organizational forms wholesale, and that this factor largely accounted for their generally lackluster performance on the battlefield. For instance, Egyptian authors such as Anwar Abdel-Malek and Mahmud Hussein have argued that from the late 1950s onwards, reliance on Russian weapons systems and the tactics which such systems necessarily implied, hindered Egyptian military operations.5 Likewise, one Western scholar writes that Arab disadvantages were heightened by the application of Russian introduced tactical models that were ill-suited for the fluid situation created by Israeli deep penetration tactics.6 These assumptions, however, are incorrect. In these three states, military doctrine and practice during the Cold War often diverged-sometimes dramatically-from Soviet norms. 7 The Syrian army most closely resembled the Red Army in its organization, tactics, and operations. The Egyptian military tended to employ Soviet organizational models, but borrowed from Soviet tactics-and to a much lesser extent Soviet operational thought-in accordance with lessons learned in past wars and their particular operational needs. The Iraqis tended toward eclecticismdespite the Soviet origin of much of their arms-adding Soviet, French, American, and indigenous Iraqi touches to their mostly British tactics. Moreover, in many cases-and contrary to conventional wisdom-Soviet practices often proved more a help than a hindrance to these militaries. First, the Soviets brought a carefully thought-through and battle-tested doctrine. Second, Soviet practices were often better suited to the dominant cultural and organizational patterns of these societies than alternative Western models. Nonetheless, the Syrian, Egyptian, and Iraqi armed forces generally fared best in battle when they adopted, and adapted, those Soviet practices that were most compatible with cultural and societal norms and the operational requirements of their armed forces, and were less successful when they failed to do so. …