Policy review · 2003 · 13 citations · 0 references
HumanitiesHistoryInternational RelationsGlobalizationModern HistoryWorld HistoryCauses Of WarInterwar PeriodWorld War IiWorld WarsHegemonic ApparatusesHegemonic DiplomacyHistory Of GlobalizationTwentieth-century Historiography
ON THE MORNING of June 28, 1914, world could rejoice in 60 years of extraordinary peace and progress. The first great age of globalization had made world seem an infinitely smaller place. So great were twin powers of technology (in shape of telephone, telegram, train, car, electricity, camera) and ideology (the gospel of free trade, guaranteed by world's hegemonic power, Britain) that Edwardian intellectuals prophesied end of all wars. Yet on that summer's day, one act of terrorism in Sarajevo--the assassination of Archduke Ferdinand and his wife by a Serbian fanatic called Gavrilo Princip--set off a sickening train of events. The world plunged into most horrific war in history, and even after killing had stopped, countries everywhere renounced their previous openness, fortifying their borders to limit movement of goods, people, and even ideas. It would be absurd to blame all miseries of first half of twentieth century on a single act of terrorism: The causes of world war and protectionist folly had been germinating for years. But those causes became clear only in retrospect. John Maynard Keynes nicely describes typical middleclass Londoner in 1914, sipping his morning tea in bed while ordering goods from around world and planning his global investments. For such a man, the projects and politics of militarism and imperialism, of racial and cultural rivalries, of monopolies, restriction and exclusions, which were to play serpent to this paradise, were little more than amusements in his daily newspaper. For such a man, and millions of others, Gavrilo Princip's two shots marked a turning point. In first edition of our book, A Future Perfect: The Challenge and Hidden Promise of Globalization (Random House, 2000), one of figures we chose to illustrate backlash against current age of globalization was another terrorist: Osama bin Laden. Drawing on research by journalist Peter L. Bergen, who had interviewed bin Laden in Afghanistan, we quoted his fury against New World Order that haughty America was imposing on world. We noted that bin Laden, like so many other opponents of globalization, had been remarkably sophisticated about exploiting process he professed to hate, using latest technology to promote his medieval message. And we argued that, for all its other merits, lowering borders had made West much more vulnerable to attack. We raised possibility of al-Qaeda using a primitive nuclear bomb to blow up World Trade Center. At time, this seemed a little far-fetched. We debated shortening section on bin Laden, lest people might think that we were paying too much attention to ramblings of a marginal crank. People were far more interested in promise of open markets and technological innovation than they were in terrorism. It was a heady time for supporters of globalization, particularly in United States. The stock market continued to defy gravity. The standard indicators of globalization pointed skyward: The volume of global trade increased steadily in decade through 2000, and foreign direct investment flows topped $1.3 trillion. Economists speculated about birth of a new economy that had banished recessions for good. Gurus speculated about Dow 36,000--or whatever other number they plucked out of their hats. This was a time when Silicon Valley and Wall Street minted new millionaires every single day, when business-school graduates confidently expected to retire at 40 and begin a new career in philanthropy, and when first signs of liberalization seemed to be awakening parts of Third World. India and China were booming after decades of state-imposed stagnation. Of course, there were serpents in this paradise, no less than there were in world of Keynes's Londoner. Too many people in developing world lived in grinding poverty. …