Militaristic Solutions in a Weak State: Internal Security, Private Contractors, and Political Leadership in Papua New Guinea

Abstract

Papua New Guinea's Sandline affair provides the most dramatic illustration of\nmilitarization among the Pacific Island states. Although this was the first resort\nto mercenaries, there have been other examples of PNG governments hiring private\nmilitary contractors for assistance in internal security matters. Recent years\nhave seen an increasing reliance on militaristic solutions to crime and other\nforms of conflict. This trend is partly a response to the well-documented weaknesses\nof the police and defense forces. Political leaders have shown a marked\npreference for "tough," "quick-fix" solutions. Reliance on militaristic responses\ncan, at one level, be viewed as a way of compensating for state weakness by relying\non its ostensibly strongest aspect. At the same time, the militaristic orientation\nof government actions in this area cannot be separated from wider societal\ntolerance of violence as a strategy for resolving conflict. Militaristic solutions\nhave not only failed to resolve problems of order but have often ended up aggravating\nthem. They have also had a debilitating impact on many of the government\nagencies concerned. Ministerial autonomy allows senior political leaders to\ninitiate and pursue militaristic schemes that have often been little more than vehicles\nfor the advancement of the individual leader's electoral and other interests.\nSuch initiatives in the area of internal security illustrate the reinforcing nexus\nbetween political patronage and the weakness of the PNG state.