Information and Its Philosophy

Abstract

Three problems in relation to Luciano Floridi’s work on the Philosophy of Information (PI) and the relationship of PI to Library and Information Science (LIS) are considered: the claim that LIS is a materials-based discipline, Floridi’s claim about Information as a message transfer system, and his downgrading of Social Epistemology to be a subset of PI. The recent history of LIS and the practice of professional library work are examined for evidence of the basis for making claims about LIS. A view of information based on individual interpretations is preferred to Floridi’s account, which is found to be too innocent of LIS practice to be accepted without revision, as is his view of LIS as an applied PI. Luciano Floridi has provided us with a sweeping review of work on Information. He has, in particular, advanced claims for a Philosophy of Information (PI), and has identified Library and Information Science (LIS) as applied PI. He has labeled us thus contra the claims of Shera and others that LIS is based on a social epistemology. If we accept Floridi’s claims, we will see ourselves as part of a larger PI movement whose problems and program have been identified by Floridi in his forthcoming Open Problems in the Philosophy of Information (OPPI)(Floridi, in press-b). Many of these problems and several parts of the program will be familiar to LIS readers, especially those concerned with work in information retrieval. Much of Floridi’s work is commendable on several counts. In particular, he has proposed a philosophical grounding to support much of what we in the LIS community do. His work reveals a deep structure of support in straight philosophy and in logic for