Fitch's Paradox
Fitch's Paradox is a logical result in epistemic logic demonstrating that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are already known, thereby challenging the principle of knowability as a viable epistemic thesis.
21
Publications
994
Citations
34
Authors
36
Institutions
Publications per year
2017–2026
3
Variants
Fitch's Paradox Of KnowabilityThe Knowability Paradox
Parents
21
‘KNOWABLE’ AS ‘KNOWN AFTER AN ANNOUNCEMENT’
Philippe Balbiani, Alexandru Baltag, Hans van Ditmarsch et al. · The Review of Symbolic Logic · 2008 · 136 citations · Full text
Timothy Williamson · Ratio · 2000 · 99 citations
Fitch's proof, verificationism, and the knower paradox
Jc Beall · Australasian Journal of Philosophy · 2000 · 83 citations · Full text
Fitch and Intuitionistic Knowability
Philip Percival · Analysis · 1990 · 64 citations
Humanities, Philosophy, Psychology +10
Is Every Truth Knowable? Reply to Williamson
Neil Tennant · Ratio · 2001 · 62 citations
1–5 of 21
34
2
h-index
2
h-index
Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France
2 publications · 187 citations
2
h-index
2
h-index
Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse, France
2 publications · 187 citations
2
h-index
1–5 of 34
36
Stanford University
Stanford, United States
3 h-index
4 publications
305 citations
University of Oxford
Oxford, United Kingdom
3 h-index
3 publications
202 citations

Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Paris, France
2 h-index
4 publications
374 citations

Université Toulouse III - Paul Sabatier
Toulouse, France
2 h-index
6 publications
561 citations
Norwich University
Northfield, United States
2 h-index
2 publications
98 citations
Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse
Toulouse, France
2 h-index
6 publications
561 citations

University of Otago
Dunedin, New Zealand
2 h-index
2 publications
187 citations
Eindhoven University of Technology
Eindhoven, The Netherlands
2 h-index
2 publications
187 citations
1–8 of 36
4 publications · 161 citations
4
h-index
2 publications · 161 citations
2
h-index
2 publications · 133 citations
2
h-index
1 publications · 21 citations
1
h-index
1 publications · 16 citations
1
h-index
1–5