Fitch's Paradox

Fitch's Paradox is a logical result in epistemic logic demonstrating that if all truths are knowable, then all truths are already known, thereby challenging the principle of knowability as a viable epistemic thesis.

21

Publications

994

Citations

34

Authors

36

Institutions

Publications per year

2017–2026

3

Variants

Fitch's Paradox Of KnowabilityThe Knowability Paradox

Authors

34

  1. AB
    Alexandru Baltag

    University of Oxford, United Kingdom

    2 publications · 187 citations

    2

    h-index

  2. PP
    Philip Percival

    Norwich University, United States

    2 publications · 98 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. HV
    Hans van Ditmarsch

    Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France

    2 publications · 187 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. PB
    Philippe Balbiani

    Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France

    2 publications · 187 citations

    2

    h-index

  5. TD
    Tiago de Lima

    Institut de Recherche en Informatique de Toulouse, France

    2 publications · 187 citations

    2

    h-index

1–5 of 34

Venues

  1. Analysis

    4 publications · 161 citations

    4

    h-index

  2. Ratio

    2 publications · 161 citations

    2

    h-index

  3. Australasian Journal of Philosophy

    2 publications · 133 citations

    2

    h-index

  4. Journal of Philosophical Logic

    1 publications · 21 citations

    1

    h-index

  5. Finance research letters

    1 publications · 16 citations

    1

    h-index

1–5